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Barsky  (1987)  shows that  for  a  Plsher  effect  to  be  scatlstlcally
observable,  the  rate  of  inflation  nust  be  petslstent.  This  denonsttatlon
follows  from  the  fact  that  if  lnflation  follows  a whlte-noise  process,  changes
ln  ex  post  lnflatlon  represent  random forecast  errors  that  will  be
uncorrelated  wlth  expected  lnflation  and nominal  interest  rates.  Therefore,
ln  thls  case,  there  need be  no  statistically  significant  relationshLp  between
inflation  and norninal  lnterest  rates  even  if  the  Fisher  relation  holds  ex
ante.  Klein  (1975)  nakes  a  siroilar  polnt  by  showing  that,  because  inflation
was relatively  unpredictable  during  the  1880-1915  gold  staudard  in  the  United
States,  there  was only  a weak ex post  Fisher  relation.  Barthhold  and Dougan
(1986),  Emery (1990),  and Hutchison  and Keeley  (1989)  show, using  U.S.  data,
that  the  forecastablllty  of  inflation  may indeed  change over  time  and,  1n
tu!n,  change the  observed  relationship  bet\reen  nominal  interest  rates  and
inflation.
Because  prevlous  work  has  exarnlned  only  U.S.  daEa,  this  paper  studies
the  behavior  of  inflation  and  norninal  interest  rates  across  countries  to  see
\shat  role  the  persistence  of  inflation  has  for  the  existence  of  Fisher
effects.
A  second  goal  of  this  paper  is  to  examine whether  the  behavior  of  rnoney
gtor{tth,  lnflation,  and  interest  rates  in  a  giwen  counEry  is  dependent  on  the
lnstitutional  characterlstics  of  the  central  bank  in  that  country.  Thls
examination  Lies  in  with  the  recent  vork  on  the  Flsher  equation  because,  in
this  work,  the  existence  of  Fisher  effects  is  hypothesized  to  depend on  the
monetary  regirne  in  place.  Speciflcally,  if  the  monetary  authoritles  carry  out
policy  in  such  a way as  to  nake  inflatlon  relatiwely  persisten!,  then  Fishereffecls  are  more  likely  to  be  observed.  Econornlc llterature  on  the  positLve
theory  of  monetary  policy  suggests  that  nonetary  policies  wlll  differ
dePendlng  on whether  the  policy-making  agent  ls  discretlonary,  denocraclcally-
elected  and relatively  short-lived,  or  whether  the  policy-rnaking  agent  ls
autonomous,  relatively  long-llved  and has  reputation  as  an  lmportant
consideration  (see,  for  example, Gordon 1975, Kydland and Prescott  L977, Baxxo
1983,  Barro  and Gordou 1983a and 1"983b, Backus and DriffiU  1985).  Bade and
Parkln  (1987)  show that,  for  the  1972-86 period,  there  is  a  negatlve
relatlonship  between  the  degree  of  pollcy  independence  of  a  centraL  bank  and
the  rate  of  inflation  thaE  ls  observed  for  that  country.  Building  on the  work
of  Bade and  Parkin,  this  paper  further  exarnines whether  there  is  a
relationship  between  centtal  bank  independence  and  inflation  rates,  paying
particular  attentlon  to  the  dynarnics of  inflation  and Fisher  effects.  Because
the  time-series  properties  of  inflation  hinge  on  those  of  noney  growth,  I
examine various  statistLcs  on  infLation  and money growth  across  nine  OECD
countries  that  have  central  banks  ruith  varying  degrees  of  lndependence.
The first  secElon  of  the  paper  reviews  ho\u the  Fisher  hypothesls  has
t)rpically  been  tested  and  the  problerns  that  thia  testing  nethodology  entails.
The ernpirical  work  follows.
Measuring Fisher  Effects
The equation  typlcally  ernployed to  test  the  Fisher  hypothesis  can be
expressed  as
R* :  a  +  I  r  ,  +  e  ,  . (1)where  R"  is  the  noninal  interest  rate  at  time  t  on bonds  that  mature  at  tiue
t+1,  €r  !s  an  error  tern,  and o  (the  real  interest  rate)  and B are  to  be
estlnated.  The strong  wersion  of  the  Flsher  hypothesis  is  that  F -  1  so  thac
a  1 percentage  polnt  rise  in  expected  inflation  causes  norninal  interest  rates
to  lise  by  I  percentage point.
If  either  lagged  lnflation  or  ex post  inflation  is  used  as  a proxy  for
expected  inflation,  seweral  problems  arise  irl  lesting  lhe  Fisher  equation
using  equation  1.  First,  as  Barsky  (1987)  poinrs  our,  if  inflarion  follows  a
white-nolse  process,  then  using  lagged  inflation  as  a  proxy  for  expected
inflation  would  yield  an estimated  p  coefficient  close  to  zero  even  though
Fisher's  theory  nay hold  one-for-one.  If,  however,  inflation  is  very
Persistent,  estinates  of  B will  be  larger  and we are  rnore likely  to  accept  the
strong  version  of  the  Flsher  hypothesis.
Second,  lf  ex  post  or  reallzed  inflation  is  used  as  a proxy  for  expected
inflatton,  an  errors  - ln-wariables  problem  must be  overcone.  Errors  in
rneasuring  expected  lnflation  will  bias  the  OLS estimate  of  B  toward  zero.  The
size  of  the  bias  ls  approximately  equal  to  the  error  wariance  as  a percentage
of  the  wariance  of  expected inflation.  If  inflation  follows  a whiEe-nolse
Process,  al1  the  variation  in  ex post  inflation  represents  random forecast
error,  and  an oLS estinate  of  B would  equal  zero  even  tttough  the  strong  form
of  the  Fisher  hypothesis  rnay  be valid.
A  further  difficulty  \sith  using  equatlon  1  is  the  assumption  that  the
real  interest  rate  ls  constant.  Seweral studies  (for  example, Mishkin  1-981,
Makin 1983) indicate  that  real  interest  rates  are  not  constant.  Hutchison  and
Keeley  (1989) note  that  if  real  interest  rates  are  not  constant,  the  estluate
of  p will  be biased  if  the  proxy  for  expecred inflauion  is  correlaEed  withfeal  interest  rates -
The above  crlticisns  nake  it  clear  that  using  equation  I  to  test  the
Fisher  hypothesis  is  hazardous.  However,  the  critlcisrns  of  using  equation  1
suggest  that  ex  post  Fishe!  effects  should  be  observable  vhen  lnflation  is
persistent.  Thts  is  ln  contrast  to  other  explanations  of  the  lack  of  Flsher
effects  during  certain  periods,  such  as  Friedman  and Schwartz,s  (1982)
atgument  that  financial  markets  only  gradually  "learued  their  Flsher,,  or
Sumers'  (1984)  "irrationaliry"  (or  nonneutrality  of  inflatlon  on real
retuhs)  argument .
Building  on the  above  insights,  Hutchison  and Keeley  (1989)  show that
the  dynamics  of  lnflation  are  linked  to  the  dynarnics of  money growth,  They do
this  by  cornblning  a  Cagan (1955)  rnoney denand functlon  with  a  sirnple
autoregressive  process  for  the  money supply  to  show that  expected  lnflatton
depends on  expected  noney  growth,  which  in  turn  depends on  the  pexsistence
noney  grolrth.l  Although  this  is  not  a novel  result,  they  extend  Barsky's
(1987) work by.pointing  out  that  whether or  not  a Fisher  effecr  is  observed
may  depend  on  the  dynanics  of  money growth  as  rcell  as  the  dynanlcs  of
lnflation.  Hutchison  and Keeley  then  show that'the  strougly  observed  ex  post
Fisher  effects  after  1961 coincide  with  an increase  in  the  forecastabilitv  of
r  This  is  probably  the  slmplesr  way of  illustraring  Barsky,s  (1987)
argument  that  the  existence  of  ex  post  Fisher  effects  is  linked  to  the
monetary  regine  in  effect.  Hutchison  and Keeley  (1989)  also  point  out  that
real  supply-slde  shocks  uay  affect  both  expected  inflation  and real  interest
rates,  thus  biasing  estirnates  of  p.  Additionally,  real  supply-side  shocks roay
cause  inflation  to  becone  autocorrelated,  and  thus  forecastable.  without  money
growth  beconing  any more forecastable.noney  growth.2
Ernpirical  Evidence
I  examine  interest  rate,  money growth,  and  inflation  data  for  nine  OECD
countries.  The data  are  from  four  countries  that  have  central  banks  that  can
be  classified  as  strong  (Gerrnany, Japan,  Switzerland,  and the  United  States)
and  flve  countries  that  have  central  banks  that  can be  classlfied  as weak
(Australia,  Canada, Denmark, Italy,  and the  United  Kingdorn).  This
classification  is  taken  fron  a  study  by  Bade and Parkin  (1,987),  vho  exarnlne
the  financial  and  instltutional  characteristics  of  different  OECD  central
banks  as  they  relate  to  their  independence  from  the  rest  of  the  governnent.
For  the  group  of  more independent  central  banks,  the  bank  is  the  final  policy
authority.  Within  this  group,  German and  Swiss  central  banks  have  rnore
lndependence  than  either  the  U.S.  or  Japanese  central  banks  because  they  are
able  to  select  board  rnernbers  without  government  approval.  Among the  group  of
countries  rtith  relatively  less  independent  central  banks,  the  final  pol-icy
authority  rests  with  the  government,  and the  government  appoints  all  board
rnernbers.  Australia  has  the  least  independence  irnong this  group  of  countries
because  its  central  bank  has  a  governnent  official  on the  board.
The data  is  quarterly  for  the  period  1972Q1-1990Q2  and are  frorn  the
International  Financlal  Statisti.cs.s  The sanple  starts  in  1972 because this
'  Enery (1990)  shows that  after  1983 lnflatton  appears Eo follow  a
white-noise  process,  and thus  Ehere is  no observed ex post  Fisher  relationship
after  1983.
3  Seasonally  adjusted  money (line  34b)  is  used  as  the  monetary  variable.
Seasonally  adjusted  money lncludes  currency  outside  banks  and  denand deposits
other  than  those  of  the  government,  The interest  raue  is  a  short-term
Treasury  bill  rate  (line  60c) where available  or  a short-term  noney narket
rate  (line  60b).  U.S.  data  are Ml  for  Ehe nonetary  aggregate,  the  three-monthdate  coincides  with  the  breakdown of  the  Bretton  ltoods  system  and  the
beginning  of  the  floating  exchange rate  period  in  which  countrles  becane able
to  set  independent  monetary  pollcies.
fnflatlon,  l{oney Glorrth  and  Interest  Rates
In  this  section,  I  exarnine inflation  and money growth  behavlor  to  see
t hether  there  is  any  lelationship  betr,reen central  bank  independence  and
x0onetary pollcy.  Table  I  presents  the  sample rneans and  standard  deviauions  of
inflation  and money grolrth  for  the  nine  countries.  As  can be  seeu  froro  this
table,  che countrles  with  nore  independent  central  banks  have  lower  average
inflation  rates  than  countries  with  relatively  weaker  central  banks.  OnIy
Switzerland  and Gernany,  hor,rever, have  average  inflation  rates  that  are
greater  than  two  standard  deviations  from  the  average  inflation  rate  of  8.6
percent  for  the  less  independent  centraL  bank  countries.  Although  there  nay
be underlying  reasons  why these  countries  have  independent  central  banks  (EhaE
is,  past  history  of  hyperinflation  periods  and/or  preferences  for  lower
inflation  rates),  there  exists,  nevertheless,  a positive  relationship  between
independent  central  banks  and relatively  lower  inflation  rates.
Table  L  shows that  there  does not  appear  to  be  any  strong  relationshlp
between  central  bank  independence  and the  variability  of  inflatlon.  While
Germany, Switzerland,  and the  United  States  are  ranked  first,  third,  and
fourth,  respectively,  Japan  is  ranked  seventh  arnong  the  nine  countties  under
conslderation.  This  suggests  that  nonetary  policy  rnay not  be  any  less
variable  in  countries  with  indeoendent  central  banks.  Table  I  also  indicates
Treasury  bill  rate  for  the  incerest  rate,  and  the  log  difference  of  the  CPI
for  inflation,  all  obtained  fron  Citibase.  The use of  M2. instead  of  M1, for
the  U.S monetary aggregate does not  quaLitatively  affect  the  results.that  there  does  not  appear  to  be  any relatlonship  between noney  growth
variabillty  and central  bank  independence.
Because mosc central  banks  use  interesC  rates  as  thelr  instruments  of
poltcy,  lt  is  possible  that  stabLe  inrerest  rates  could  be  identlfied  wirh
stable  nonetary  pollcy,  Table  2 shor,rs  the  standard  deviations  of  short-tern
nomlnal  interest  rates  across  the  nine  countries  for  the  L972-90  sanDle.  Of
the  five  countries  wlth  the  lowest  standard  deviations,  four  have  independent
central  banks  (the  United  Kingdom is  the  exception).  There  are  several
obvlous  problems,  however, with  this  measure  of  policy  stability.  First,  the
Fisher  equation  states  that  nominal  interest  rates  should  vary  to  reflect
changes  ln  inflation  expectations.  If  central  banks  are  ufirilling  to  allow
interest  rates  to  move vith  changes  in  inflation  expectacions,  this  suggests
that  policy  is  contributlng  to  insrability  rather  rhan  stability.  Examining
real  lnterest  rates  avoids  this  problern,  buL  there  are  nany  factors  that
contribute  to  movenents  in  real  interest  rates.  A11 of  this  suggests  that
because  cencral  banks  rnanipulate  interest  rates  with  a vieu  toward  controlling
psrticular  monetary  aggregates,  r,zhich in  turn  dete  line  inflation,  there  is  no
lnconsistency  in  using  the  variabiliuy  of  lnflation  as  an  indicator  of  the
stability  of  policy.  Still,  Ehe  weak inverse  relationshlp  between countries
with  stronger  independent  central  banks  and short-term  interest  rate
varlability  is  interestlng.
Table  3 shovrs  the  tesulcs  of  estirnating  simple  first-order
autoregressive  processes  for  lnflation  and rnoney grolrth.  This  estimation  is
carried  out  to  examine r,rhether there  is  ary  relationship  between  cenCral  bank
lndependence  and  the  dynamics  of  inflation  and noney  Brouth.  The results  of
Lhe exanination  are  also  used to  see whether the  existence  of  Fisher  effectsls  dependent  on  the  persistence  of  inflatlon,  as  Barsky  first  suggested,
The results  in  Table  3  lndicate  chat  there  does rrot  apFear  to  be  arly
relatlonship  between  central  bank  independence  and  inflation  or  money glo\rth
PersLstence.  I,Ihile  Geruany is  ranked  flrst  r.rith  the  largest  autoreglessive
coeffici.ent,  Switzerland  has  the  least  autoregressive  noney  growth  process  of
all  nine  countries.  The inflation  process estinates  yleld  a slnilar
conclusion.  There  does not  appear  to  be  any  relationshlp  betrdeen central  bank
independence  and  the  degree  of  autocorrelation  in  the  inflation  process.
An interesting  result  that  does stand  out,  though,  is  the  sirnilarltles
in  rankings,  and  to  a  lesser  degree  che xnagnitude of  the  autoregressive
coefficient  themselwes,  for  money growth  and  inflation  processes  in  a  glven
country.  Although  there  is  no  ewidence  on  causation  here,  the  results  pxovide
further  evidence  that  noney  growth  and  inflacion  are  closely  linked.
In  Table  4,  Ljung-Box statistics  are  presented  that  test  the  null
hypothesis  of  no autocorrelation  (that  is,  white  noise)  after  eight  lags.
This  provldes  furLher  evidence  on  the  degree  of  persislence  in  the  inflation
and money growth  processes  for  the  niue  countries.  For  inflation,  the  null
hypothesis  is  rejected  for  all  nine  countries.  In  ranking  the  nagnitude  of
the  Ljung-Box  statistics,  we can  get  an  idea  of  how far  away frou  whlte  noise
the  different  countries'  lnflatlon  processes  are.  The rankings  of  the  Ljung-
Box stacistlcs  give  approxinately  the  sane rankings  as  did  the  AR(l)
estination  of  the  different  inflation  series.  The onlv  exceDtion  is  the
Netherlands,  which  ranked  seventh  in  terns  of  the  size  of  the  first-ofder
autoregressive  coefficlent  on  inflation  but  ranked  first  in  terms  of  beins
furthest  ar,ray  from  whlte  noise  as  given  by  the  Ljun-Box  statistic.
The country  rankings  on  the  Ljung-Box  statistics  for  money growth  uatchrelatively  sinilarly  the  rankings  for  the  AR(1)  coefficients  on uoney  gronth.
As  evldenced  by  both  the  size  of  the  AR(l)  coefficients  and  the  Ljung-Box
statlstlcs,  noney  growth  has  rnuch less  persistence  than  inflation.  In  fact,
for  the  Nethetlands  and Switzerland,  white  nolse  cannot  be  rejected  at  a  .05
level  of  s  lgnificance  ,
Ex Post  Flsher  Effecrs
Table  5 presents  the  estimates  of  equatlon  1  that  yield  Flsher  effeets
as  measured by  the  estinates  of  B.  Again,  there  does not  appear  to  be  any
relatlonship  betr,reen central  bank  independence  and  the  observance  of  Fisher
effects.  Gernany yields  the highest  esrimate  of  p  equat  to  .38 so that  a L
Percentage point  increase  in  the  inflation  rate  results  in  a  .38 percenE
lncrease  in  the  short-term  nominal  interest  rate.  Switzerland,  on  tbe  other
hand,  yields  a suatistically  insignificanr  negative  estinate  of  p.
The results,  however,  support  Barsky.s  (1987) persistence  of  inflation
explanatlon  for  why \re nay  or  may not  observe  Fisher  effects.  The second and
third  colunns  of  Table  5  give  the  rankings  of  inflation  and money gro\rth
Persistence  copied  from Table  3.  It  is  clear  that  there  is  a high  degree of
correlation  between  Fisher  effects  and the  persistence  of  inflacion  and money
growth  for  a  given  country.
Conclus ions
Because of  the  problens  stated  above in  using  estinates  from  equation  1
test  Ehe Fisher  hypothesis,  the  results  in  Table  5 do no!  constitute  a test
the  Fisher  hypochesis.  Instead,  the  results  provide  further  support  for
co
ofBarsky's  (1987)  contentton  that  the  nonetary  regiue  in  place,  speciflcally  the
lnflation  process  that  this  regirne yields,  will  be  of  primary  ixoportance  ln
deternining  whether  or  not  Fisher  effects  are  observed..  Thls  ls  tn  contrast
to  explanations  by  other  authors  (Friedman  and Schwartz  1982,  Suuners  1984).
The results  ln  this  paper  are  also  consistent  with  Hutchlson  and
Keeley's  (1989)  observation  that,  because  the  d)manica  of  money grorrth  affect
the  dynanics  of  inflation,  we should  expect  to  observe  Fisher  effects  l'hen
noney  growth  is  persistent  and forecastable.
Additionally,  the  results  here  confirm  Bade and Parkin's  (1987)  findlngs
that  more  indePenden!  central  banks  yield  lower  average  inflation  rates  but  do
rtot  aPpear  to  l-nfluence  the  wariability  of  inflation,  a  reasonable  measure of
policy  stability.  The results  in  this  paper  al-so show rhar,  for  a  given
country,  the  dynamics  of  inflation  and money growth  do not  appear  to  be
affected  by  the  degree  of  centEal  bank  independence.  Therefore,  although  the
observance  of  Fisher  effects  depends on  the  monetary  regirne  in  place,  central
bank  independence  does not  appear  to  be  one  of  the  relevanc  factors  for
whether  or  not  Fisher  effecEs  are  observed.
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AR(l)  Estixnarion  of  Inflation  and Money crowth
Mone)' Groltth  Tnflation
Const.  p  Rz  Consts.  p  Rz
Gernany  .032  ,54f  .29  (1)  1.45  .583  .34  (4)
(.00e)  (.100)  (.44e)  (  .  oes)
Switzerland  .080  .nf  .00  (9)  2.06  .44:-  .19  (g)
(.023)  (.21e)  (.572)  (.  106)
Japan  .053  .37i  .13  (s)  2.36  .s6g  .31  (5)
(.0r4)  (.113)  (.8s7)  (.098)
United states  .038  .544  .29  (Z)  1.39  .7g8  .62  (1)
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<.0r7)  (.104)  (1.1e)  (.08s)
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